Mill’s writings were concerned with power over the individual, but not merely with the legislative power of the state; he was deeply concerned with the moral force that society was capable of exercising over the individual. It was not merely the capacity of an over powerful government or monarch about which he wrote. The capacity for the tyranny of the majority over the individual also concerned him deeply. For this reason it is perhaps surprising that he installed caveats immediately after his principle; a man’s own good was a valid reason “for remonstrating with him, or reasoning, or persuading, or entreating” (Mill: pg 9). This level of input that Mill considered acceptable under such circumstances perhaps goes a long way towards mitigating the lack of any compulsive interference that he was willing to accept – in his eyes, a sufficiently great force of remonstration represented an almost compulsive effect due to societal forces, against which he frequently railed. Even though his principle would ban any actual compulsion, consideration of Mill’s normal arguing position reveals that he was prepared to permit events in the interests of protective paternalism which he typically considered to be undue influence over others. The interplay between state, society and the individual is a leitmotif of Mill’s writings, and merely because the theory he states forbids the state from carrying out an act does not mean that he does not feel it should be permitted; indeed, in this scenario when not only does he not forbid societal interaction, but positively encourages intervention of a kind suggests that he was willing to allow society to attempt to morally force people down a route which was less harmful to the individual concerned. The principle itself remains simple, but the context in which it is framed is significantly more complex.