墨尔本论文代写：洛克个人身份的标准
我是谁？是什么让我，我？个人身份理论一直被认为是哲学中最复杂的问题之一，在哲学上有了更深的层次。个人身份理论试图“处理一个人在同一时间和地点的问题是同一个人在另一个时间和地点”[我]。当我们看待个人的身份时，我们正在试图找出什么东西使我们远离其他物质、物种和个体。在这篇文章中我将讨论个人身份的理论同约翰·洛克的意识标准，为什么他不认为其他身体或心理健康的标准，Locke则由托马斯·里德运用及物性类比的逻辑提出了挑战，最后提出如何知道记忆重叠链，德里克帕菲特对改革洛克看来可以满足托马斯·里德提出的挑战是一个很好的解决方案的挑战，因为它使洛克的理论完整，还增加了传递性，瑞德洛克理论的挑战。
当讨论个人身份时，身份的标准将强烈地依赖于你所谈论的对象。对于自我或个人的个人身份的标准，有许多观点是。一些观点认为，自我的标准是有机的，我们的身体是什么，随着时间的推移，我们确定。洛克说，这个标准对于一个人的个人身份是不适用的情况一样的身体因为开关（怪异的星期五的情况）。如果两个人的意识被切换，每个人都会认为你是同一个人，因为你看起来像同一个人。然而，它实际上并不是你在你的身体里，因为你的身体里有一个不同的意识，你的身体不再是你，你的身体不能定义你的个人身份。其他观点描述的标准是物质，使我们相同的随着时间的推移。物质包括非物质（灵魂）和物质物质。据洛克说，物质作为一种标准，不适用于一个人的个人身份，因为这样的情况下，死亡。当你死了，你可能是由同一种物质，但如果你停止思考（思想是连接到一个人），那么你就不会存在，没有个人的身份。
洛克看一个心理标准来定义一个人的个人身份。根据洛克，一个人或自我是不同的，而不仅仅是物质和一个生物。一个人是“一个有理性和反思的思维智慧的人，可以把自己视为自己，在不同的时间和地点的同一种思考的东西，它只由那个意识，这是不可分割的思维”[②]。这描述了所谓的性意识。我们是同一个人，到这一点，我们意识到我们的过去和未来的记忆或精神状态，以同样的方式，我们是意识到我们目前的记忆或精神状态。这个标准也可以被分解成一个比喻说：此人是洛克人Y如果人是自觉与X在某种意义上说，人能记住的想法和行动，根据洛克人x一样，个人身份的必要条件是相同的意识。这一意识直接来自于记忆和经验。洛克认为，意识的一致性是一个人的个人身份的理想标准，因为意识总是与思维，可以认为是一个人一个人，让那个人来区分自己从另一个的想法，早在我们的意识可以扩展到任何过去的思想到目前为止，我们的身份后，将延长。早在过去的人可以重复或反思过去的思想或行动，其目前的意识，到目前为止，是个人的身份。
墨尔本论文代写：洛克个人身份的标准
Who am I? What makes me, me? The theory of personal identity has been considered one of the most complicated questions that philosophy has taken a deeper look into. The theory of personal identity tries to "deal with the questions about how an individual at one time and place is the same individual at another time and place" [i] . When we look at personal identity, we are trying to figure out what sets us apart from other pieces of matter, species and individuals. In this essay I will discuss John Locke's criterion of sameness of consciousness for the theory of personal identity and why he does not think that other physical or psychological criteria fit, a challenge to Locke's criterion posed by Thomas Reid using the logic of transitivity analogy, and lastly how the suggested idea of overlapping chains of memory that Derek Parfit poses to reform Locke's view so that it may meet the challenge posed by Thomas Reid is a good solution to the challenge because it keeps Locke's theory intact and also adds the transitivity property that Reid challenges Locke's theory on.
When discussing personal identity, the criterion of identity will strongly depend on the object that you are talking about. There have been many viewpoints as to what the criterion of personal identity of the self or a person is. Some viewpoints suggest that the criterion for the self is organic; that our body is what identifies us over time. Locke states that this criterion is not applicable for personal identity of a person because of situations like body switch (Freaky Friday situation). If the consciousness of two people were to switch, everyone would think that you are the same person because you look like the same person. However, it is not actually you in your body and because there is a different consciousness in your body, and your body is no longer you; your body cannot define your personal identity. Other views describe the criterion as being substance that makes us the same over time. Substance includes both non-physical (soul) and physical substances. According to Locke, substance as a criterion is not applicable for personal identity of a person because of situations like death. When you die, you may be made of the same substance, but if you cease to think (thinking is connected to being a person) then you cease to exist and have no personal identity.
Locke looks towards a psychological criterion to define personal identity of a person. According to Locke, a person or the self is different than just matter and just a living thing. A person is "a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking" [ii] . This describes what is known as sameness of consciousness. We are the same person to the point where we are conscious of our past and future memory or mental state in the same way that we are conscious of our current memory or mental state. This criterion can also be broken down into an analogy said by Locke: person x is the same as person y if person y is consciously connected to x in the sense that person y can remember the thoughts and actions of person x. According to Locke, the necessary criterion of personal identity is sameness of consciousness. This sameness of consciousness comes directly from memory and experience. Locke believes that the sameness of consciousness is the ideal criterion of personal identity for a person because since consciousness is always connected to thinking, and being able to think is what makes a person a person and allows that person to distinguish its own thoughts from another's, as far back as our consciousness can be extended to any past thought, so far back will our identity extend. As far back as the person can repeat or reflect on a past thought or action with its current consciousness, so far back is the personal identity of the person.
