纽约大学代写论文:前合同和后合同问题
本文将考察克莱因和长安公司在回答供应链中的概念的工作，也将检查前合同和后合同问题，导致举行了。分配的第一部分着眼于如何不完整的合同的概念，导致问题的举行，在通用汽车公司和渔民的情况下的情况下。
在第二部分的分配中，是关于如何其他因素如资产专用性和锁定导致与建设项目的合同后的合同中的问题。也看看在信息产业方面的情况下，在它的闪光-苹果的冲突。
举行是一个情况，有两个政党（说，买方和供应商），一方必须为贸易作出具体的投资。如果投资仅特定于客户，那么供应商很容易把握上亦然，如果产品设计是特定的原材料的供应商则买方必然有风险高举起（克莱恩，1996）。具有更高权力的政党谋求实现准租金[ 1 ]。把交易成本经济学是近视的问题。
抢劫发生在各种情况下的前和后契约义务的合同。正如威廉姆森（威廉姆森，1985），它可能是供应商合同或克莱因的不确定性理论在市场条件或导致敲竹杠买方的道德风险的机会主义行为或不良行为问题。
正如克莱因所解释的，“买方/供应商的冲突可能是由于不可预料的事件发生在他们的合同期限，如减少/增加的成本或需求，这显然把一方与更高的议价能力，从而改变了权力动态的关系。在较高的执政党试图违约或投机取巧，为了实现准租金”（Klien，1996）。
威廉姆森的可行的远见/远视的概念可能是一个可能的解决方案的购买组织避免或克服的问题举行了。人是有限理性的，有近视的观点是一个问题。克莱因着眼于在解决问题的合同中的作用，并说，自我执行范围的合同和一个更好的书面合同的评估可以避免的情况。
“解决或考虑持有问题的方法一直在交易成本经济学的核心。也有一些场合，双方都知道未来有可能在举行，但考虑到在合同中定义的每一个和每一个应急的成本和时间是不可行的“（票价，2006）。
下面我将讨论几个保持明显的情况，在不同的情况下采取了什么样的纠正措施。
纽约大学代写论文:前合同和后合同问题
This paper will examine the work of Klein and Chang & Ive in answering the concept of hold-up in the supply chain and also will examine the pre-contractual and post-contractual issues leading to hold-up. The first part of the assignment looks at how concept of incomplete contracts led to problem of hold-up in case of the General Motors and the Fisher's case.
In the second part of the assignment, is about how other factors like asset specificity and lock-in leads to hold-up problems post contractual in reference with the construction projects. Also look at the case of hold-up in the IT industry in regard to the Flash - Apple clash.
Hold-up is a situation where there are two parties (say, buyer and supplier) and one party has to make specific investments for the trade. If the investment is specific only to that customer, then the supplier is vulnerable to hold-up and on the visa-versa, if the product designed is specific to the raw material possessed by the supplier then the buyer is bound to have higher risk of hold-up (Klien, 1996). The party with the higher power seeks to achieve the quasi-rents [1] . Hold-up on the transactions cost economics is the problem of short-sightedness.
Hold-ups can occur under various situations both pre-contractually and post-contractually. As explained by Williamson (Williamson, 1985), it could be Opportunistic behaviour of supplier pre-contractually or Klein's theory of uncertainty in the market condition or the issue of moral hazard or bad behaviour by the buyer that leads to the hold-up situation.
As explained by Klein, "the buyer/supplier conflict can be due to unanticipated events that occur during their contractual term; like reduced/increased cost or demand, which clearly puts one party with the higher bargaining power and thus changing the power dynamics in the relationship. The party with the higher power tries to breach the contract or be opportunistic in order to achieve the quasi-rents." (Klien, 1996)
Williamson's concept of feasible foresight/farsightedness could be a possible solution for the buying organisations to avoid or negate the issue of hold-up. People are boundedly rational and having a myopic view is a problem. Klein looks at the role of contracts in solving the problem of hold-up and says the assessment of self-enforcing range of the contract and a better written contract can avoid the situation.
"The ways of solving or taking into account the problem of hold-up has been in the core of transaction cost economics. There have been occasions where both parties know that there is a possibility in hold-up in future but considering the cost and time involved in defining each and every contingency in the contract is not feasible" (Fares, 2006).
Below I will be discussing a few cases where hold-up was evident and what corrective actions were taken under different circumstances.
