举行是一个情况，有两个政党（说，买方和供应商），一方必须为贸易作出具体的投资。如果投资仅特定于客户，那么供应商很容易把握上亦然，如果产品设计是特定的原材料的供应商则买方必然有风险高举起（克莱恩，1996）。具有更高权力的政党谋求实现准租金[ 1 ]。把交易成本经济学是近视的问题。
This paper will examine the work of Klein and Chang & Ive in answering the concept of hold-up in the supply chain and also will examine the pre-contractual and post-contractual issues leading to hold-up. The first part of the assignment looks at how concept of incomplete contracts led to problem of hold-up in case of the General Motors and the Fisher’s case.
In the second part of the assignment, is about how other factors like asset specificity and lock-in leads to hold-up problems post contractual in reference with the construction projects. Also look at the case of hold-up in the IT industry in regard to the Flash – Apple clash.
Hold-up is a situation where there are two parties (say, buyer and supplier) and one party has to make specific investments for the trade. If the investment is specific only to that customer, then the supplier is vulnerable to hold-up and on the visa-versa, if the product designed is specific to the raw material possessed by the supplier then the buyer is bound to have higher risk of hold-up (Klien, 1996). The party with the higher power seeks to achieve the quasi-rents  . Hold-up on the transactions cost economics is the problem of short-sightedness.
Hold-ups can occur under various situations both pre-contractually and post-contractually. As explained by Williamson (Williamson, 1985), it could be Opportunistic behaviour of supplier pre-contractually or Klein’s theory of uncertainty in the market condition or the issue of moral hazard or bad behaviour by the buyer that leads to the hold-up situation.
As explained by Klein, “the buyer/supplier conflict can be due to unanticipated events that occur during their contractual term; like reduced/increased cost or demand, which clearly puts one party with the higher bargaining power and thus changing the power dynamics in the relationship. The party with the higher power tries to breach the contract or be opportunistic in order to achieve the quasi-rents.” (Klien, 1996)
Williamson’s concept of feasible foresight/farsightedness could be a possible solution for the buying organisations to avoid or negate the issue of hold-up. People are boundedly rational and having a myopic view is a problem. Klein looks at the role of contracts in solving the problem of hold-up and says the assessment of self-enforcing range of the contract and a better written contract can avoid the situation.
“The ways of solving or taking into account the problem of hold-up has been in the core of transaction cost economics. There have been occasions where both parties know that there is a possibility in hold-up in future but considering the cost and time involved in defining each and every contingency in the contract is not feasible” (Fares, 2006).
Below I will be discussing a few cases where hold-up was evident and what corrective actions were taken under different circumstances.